The Justices of the Peace Courts of Hamilton County, Ohio; and Comparative Judicial Criminal Statistics: Ohio and Maryland (Book Reviews) by Probst, Nathan, Jr.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 7 
Number 1 Volume 7, December 1932, Number 1 Article 37 
June 2014 
The Justices of the Peace Courts of Hamilton County, Ohio; and 
Comparative Judicial Criminal Statistics: Ohio and Maryland 
(Book Reviews) 
Nathan Probst Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Probst, Nathan Jr. (1932) "The Justices of the Peace Courts of Hamilton County, Ohio; and Comparative 
Judicial Criminal Statistics: Ohio and Maryland (Book Reviews)," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 7 : No. 1 , 
Article 37. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss1/37 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
planned and painstakingly prepared by a scholarly teacher who has brought to
his task the experience of many years of successful teaching of the law of
Property.
JoHN P. MALONEY.
St. John's College School of Law.
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE COURTS OF HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO. By Paul
F. Douglass. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932, pp. VI, 118.
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL CRIMINAL STATISTICS: OHIO AND MARYLAND. By L. C.
Marshall. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932, pp. VIII, 83.
Both monographs published under the supervision of the Institute of Law
of Johns Hopkins University.
It is regrettable that these two monographs will have but a limited circu-
lation. Their influence would be greater, their effect more fortunate, if they
could at least reach the desks of the editors of our daily newspapers so that
these editors might be induced to read them.
During the last decade it has become increasingly clear to lawyers con-
nected with criminal causes, that once a criminal case is sent to the jury, the
verdict in most instances is "guilty." Nevertheless, the current public idea is
that a conviction by a jury is rare because of obsolete rules which unduly
hamper prosecution. Newspapers have been suggesting such possible remedies,
as that the guarantee against self-incrimination be withdrawn, that the majority
verdict be substituted in place of the unanimous jury verdict, that three trial
judges, rather than a jury, should pass on the issue of the defendant's guilt. In
the state of Ohio, according to Mr. Marshall, only in 2.6 per cent of those cases
tried were the defendants freed by acquittal after trial; and there is nothing in
Mr. Douglass' statement which would indicate that it is the purported frustra-
tion of successful prosecution under the existing legal system which contains
the explanation for the unfortunate condition existent in the administration of
the criminal law.
The invaluable data that these two scholars have gathered and collated
compels the conclusion that factors other than those that now appeal to the
popular mind must be found to explain the so-called crime wave. It is urged
that public attention be directed to fact-finders, and that their statistics should
displace the irresponsible and unscientific opinions of rhetoric artists.
That crime may be prevalent in the United States the reviewer will admit,
but the law is competent to deal with the young man who turns robber or
murderer. When a community is thoroughly aroused by newspaper clamor, a
jury will often say "guilty" despite unsubstantial evidence; a trial judge will
impose a long term of imprisonment, or even the death penalty; in due course,
an appellate court will affirm without opinion, especially without opinion if real
errors on the part of the trial court are urged and established by the appellant.
It is submitted by the reviewer that it is not the boy robber who shames
the administration of justice; rather it is the glorified racketeer who operates
BOOK REVIEWS
under protection; the state or federal district attorney who uses his office as a
publicity bureau to attain a nomination for high office; the judge who turns his
court room into a free-for-all show; the daily newspaper with its haunch,
paunch and jowl methods, giving first place to that part or group of our
so-called "respectability" that considers itself the holder of letters patent to
cheat and loot.
There are no facts which justify a finding by the scientific mind that the
traditions pronounced in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution or in
the civil rights laws of the various states, have become moribund in our society.
Perhaps time will establish that there is greater vitality in the spirit which
pervades the opinion in Entict v. Carrington and the Three Others Kings'
Messengers,' in which are embodied Lord Camden's condemnation of unreason-
able searches and seizures, than in People v. Defore.2 And this may be so
despite the fact that some forty states have seized with avidity the underlying
attitude of the New York Court of Appeals towards unreasonable searches and
seizures and follow its reasoning.
NATHAN PROBST, JR.
St. John's College School of Law.
CASES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP. By Charles E. Clark and William 0.
Douglas. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1932, pp. XV, 743.
In appraising the value of a new selection of cases on any legal subject,
one unconsciously searches the volume to ascertain whether the author has
included his "latest favorites." If they are found the book is worth while; to
the extent of their omissions, its value depreciates. Subjected to this test, this
newest addition to the American Casebook Series will undoubtedly meet the
approval of all. There are included in the one volume about five hundred cases
and although they are not all reported in full, they are sufficiently discussed in
the footnotes and text to apprise the student and lawyer of their holdings and
to distinguish them from the principal reported cases. Many of the recent
opinions included in the selection deal with the interpretation of the Uniform
Partnership Law and, as the authors have chosen from many states, it is
possible to note wherein the coqrts have adopted uniformity in construing the
statute.
If not content with this superficial examination, one turns to the arrange-
ment of the cases. Has the author, we ask, followed the usual classification or
is the law developed along different lines. Professors Clark and Douglas have,
indeed, charted an entirely new course. They have omitted the usual introduc-
tory cases respecting the nature of the partnership and the tests to determine
its existence. Instead, the student is presented at the very beginning with those
interesting problems concerning the liability of persons carrying on business
'19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1762).
2242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
